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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 60,000 Californians in August alone. The 
consequences of these growing foreclosures are being felt by families who have lost their main 
asset and residence, neighborhoods that suffer lower property values, local governments that 
incur increasing costs and decreasing tax revenue, and the broader California economy which is 
heavily dependent on the housing market. Yet a key question remains - is foreclosure the only 
option?  
 
Approximately two million loans are facing rising interest rate resets in the U.S. over the next 
two years, and many borrowers will be unable to meet their increased mortgage payment. Over 
500,000 Californians may be at risk of foreclosure. For many of these borrowers, perhaps the 
best they can hope for is that they will be able to negotiate with their loan servicer for a loan 
modification, which would make the terms of the loan more affordable to them.  
 
The good news is that servicers routinely say they want to negotiate loan modifications and keep 
borrowers in their homes. The bad news is that anecdotes and data suggest that these loan 
modifications are not really occurring.  
 
CRC surveyed 33 of the roughly 80 mortgage counseling agencies across the state which are 
certified by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to assist borrowers at risk 
of foreclosure. Mortgage counseling agencies are often the only place for borrowers to turn when 
they are faced with foreclosure. Counselors help borrowers understand their options and often act 
as intermediaries between borrowers and their lenders. The groups that responded to this CRC 
survey served approximately 9,800 consumers, including nearly 3,800 consumers through in-
person meetings, in the month of August alone. Sadly, they reported that the most common 




Lenders not responsive. Agencies were asked if servicers consistently modify loans by fixing 
interest rates for the life of the loan. Most counseling agencies reported that the industry as a 
whole is not consistently modifying loans for long term affordability. 
 
Postponing the day of reckoning. In general, for borrowers in early delinquency or facing 
unaffordable interest rate resets, servicers are not fixing interest rates for the long term. 
Counseling groups were most likely to respond that lenders were only willing to fix interest rates 
for one year at a time when they were willing to modify loans. This was true for individual 
lenders and for all lenders as a whole.  These short term modifications most likely only delay the 
problem for another year, and are akin to giving the borrower another bad loan with a short 




Devastating Borrower Outcomes. Counseling agencies were asked about common outcomes 
for borrowers having trouble with their loans:  
• Foreclosures lead. Groups were most likely to report foreclosure a “very common” 
outcome for borrowers. 19 groups reported foreclosure as a very common outcome. 
• Short sales next.  11 groups cited short sales - where servicers agree to allow 
homeowners to sell the property for less than the amount of money owed – as a “very 
common” outcome for borrowers. 
• Beneficial loan modifications and refinances are not happening. A large 21 groups 
reported that refinancings were “not common” and 15 groups reported that loan 
modifications were “not common.” Only one counseling agency responded that loan 
modifications are a “very common” outcome for borrowers; only one group responded 
that refinancings were a “very common” outcome for borrowers. 
 
No early outreach to borrowers in trouble. Despite lenders assertions about reaching out to 
borrowers BEFORE they face problems from rising interest rates and increasing monthly 
payments, most counseling agencies do not see this happening.  Most groups said that in their 
experience, the industry as a whole was NOT making contact with borrowers before 
delinquency. Only one group reported that early contact was being made. 
 
Out of the mouths of mortgage counselors- frustration. When asked to comment on servicers 
that are especially difficult to work with, counseling agencies expressed frustration with 
companies that do not offer any real solutions and that provide poor customer service. 
Representative of counselor comments was this: “All lenders said they don’t want to foreclose on 
home[s]. But when it comes to giving their customers an option, they always want the full 
amount of the delinquency and refuse to change the terms to help the borrower.” 
 
Moody’s says loan modifications are not happening. Ratings agency Moody’s recently 
released the results of a survey it conducted of the modification practices of subprime mortgage 
servicers regarding borrowers that have or will experience an interest rate reset on their loans in 
either 2007 or 2008. Sixteen servicers with a total servicing volume of approximately $950 
billion, or roughly 80% of the market, provided data. “Specifically, the survey showed that most 
servicers had only modified approximately 1% of their serviced loans that experienced a reset in 





In order to keep borrowers in their homes, and to address the concerns of housing counseling 




Lenders Must:  
 
1. Modify loans to keep all borrowers in their homes. Lenders should lower interest rates, 
convert adjustable rate loans to fixed rate loans for the long term, and reduce the amount of 
money owed in order to stabilize families.  
 
2. Be more transparent and accountable.  Servicers must report semiannually on their loss 
mitigation outcomes, including how many loans went to loan modification, refinance, payment 
plan, forbearance agreement, short sale, deed in lieu, and foreclosure. 
 
3. Return foreclosed properties to the community.  Lenders should develop a process to sell 
foreclosed properties to nonprofit groups so that properties won’t fall into the hands of 
unscrupulous speculators and disinterested investors. Local nonprofits that acquire these 
properties can help first time homebuyers build assets or create affordable rental housing 
opportunities that preserve the property as a community asset. 
 
4. Support home loan counseling agencies and legal service providers.  Lenders should 
dramatically increase funding for counseling agencies and legal service providers who are on the 
front lines of the foreclosure crisis.   
 
Policy Makers Must: 
 
1. Pass laws that promote loan modifications and tax relief for short sales. Congress needs to 
amend the Bankruptcy Code to permit bankruptcy judges to modify the terms of homeowners 
mortgages, and provide tax relief for the increasing number of borrowers facing a short sale. 
 
2. Develop a state rescue refinance loan product. Efforts to expand FHA loan products are 
positive but will not go far enough to help most homeowners in distress in California. The state 
must step into this void to help low and moderate income borrowers who have been victimized 
by predatory lending practices and are at risk of losing their homes. With California in the midst 
of a foreclosure crisis, the legislature and Governor did little this session to help borrowers at 
risk of losing their homes.  
 
3. Pass strong anti predatory lending legislation to ensure problems don’t recur. Congress 
and the state legislature must prevent this crisis from recurring by passing strong anti-predatory 
lending legislation that requires that loans be suitable for borrowers, and that bans prepayment 
penalties and yield spread premiums. Legislation must hold investors and Wall Street firms liable 
for violations so that they will stop financing predatory loans that place borrowers at risk. 
 
4. Provide real oversight. Legislators must fulfill their oversight responsibilities and ensure that 
regulatory agencies are monitoring compliance of lenders and brokers and taking enforcement 




Lenders moved to foreclose on nearly 60,000 Californians in August alone. The consequences of 
these growing foreclosures are being felt by families who must find new places to live, 
neighborhoods that witness a further decline in property values, local governments that suffer 
costs and decreased tax revenue, and the broader California economy which is heavily dependent 
on the housing market. Yet a key question remains - was foreclosure the only option?  
In May, when foreclosure rates began skyrocketing to record-breaking numbers, the California 
Reinvestment Coalition called on the state’s largest home mortgage lenders to create alternatives 
to foreclosure. In initial meetings with these lenders, they promised that they would do all they 
could to keep Californians in their homes, including modifying loan terms and rates to make 
them more affordable to borrowers facing foreclosure. But months after these promises were 
made, borrowers and their mortgage counselors say lenders are unwilling to provide loan 
modifications and other alternatives to help troubled borrowers.  
Lenders are not required to quantify their promises and, as an industry, have offered no real and 
verifiable reporting to show that they are working with borrowers to prevent foreclosure. CRC 
conducted this survey of 33 mortgage counseling agencies across the state to determine what 
assistance lenders are offering borrowers. Sadly, counselors reported that the most common 
outcomes for their borrowers were foreclosures and short sales, neither of which keeps borrowers 
in their homes or works to solve the growing crisis.  
Mortgage counseling agencies are often the only place for borrowers to turn when they are faced 
with foreclosure. Counselors help borrowers understand their options and often act as 
intermediaries between borrowers and their lenders. In California, there are roughly 80 mortgage 
counseling offices approved by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to 
provide services that include loss mitigation, mortgage delinquency and default resolution, 
predatory lending and post purchase counseling.  More than one-third of these counseling 
agencies took part in CRC’s survey. The groups that responded to this CRC survey served 
approximately 9,800 consumers, including nearly 3,800 consumers through in-person meetings, 
in the month of August alone. This was an increase of 3,700 consumers, including 1,600 
additional face to face meetings, from February of this year. Based on their experiences, the 
counselors report that lenders have not been easy to work with, and have not been as quick to 
offer loan modifications as they claim. 
 
SURVEY OF HOME LOAN COUNSELING AGENCIES 
 
Counseling agencies report that times are tough for homeowners in California, and that home 
loan servicers are not providing enough flexibility to help borrowers avoid foreclosure and short 
sale. Counseling agencies were asked to answer a few questions about their success in working 
with servicers. The state’s largest servicers were pulled out for consideration: Bank of America, 
Citibank, Countrywide, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, Merrill Lynch (Wilshire, HLS), Washington 
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Mutual, and Wells Fargo. A category of “all lenders” was also included to survey counselors on 
their impressions of industry performance as a whole. 
 
Over the last few years, lenders and brokers sold many loans to borrowers that borrowers could 
not understand or afford to repay. Even the banking regulators recognized this and have since 
proposed guidance on nontraditional and subprime lending to tighten underwriting standards.  
 
But in too many cases, the damage has been done, and borrowers are stuck with loans that have 
resetting interest rates that will make the loans impossible to pay. Approximately two million 
loans are facing rate resets in the U.S. over the next two years, and many will be unable to meet 
their increased mortgage payment. Over 500,000 Californians may be at risk of foreclosure. For 
many of these borrowers, perhaps the best they can hope for is that they will be able to negotiate 
with their loan servicer for a loan modification, which would make the terms of the loan more 
affordable to them.  
 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chair Sheila Bair has commented on the need for servicers to 
do more to keep borrowers in their homes. “I’m frustrated that… we’re getting reports that 
servicing restructuring has not reached the level that I hoped it would,” she said. “We have this 
huge problem on our hands, and we can’t do this kind of case-by-case, laborious restructuring 
process with all these millions of loans,” Ms. Bair said. I think some categorical approaches are 
needed… Just convert that mortgage into a fixed-rate mortgage, keep it at the starter rate, convert 
it into a fixed rate, make it permanent, and get on with it,” Ms. Bair said.1 
 
California housing counseling agencies surveyed confirm that more needs to be done. 
 
Lenders not responsive. Agencies were asked if particular servicers, and servicers in general, 
consistently modify loans by fixing interest rates for the life of the loan. 
• No long term modifications. 24 groups responded that the industry as a whole is not 
consistently modifying loans for long term affordability. 
• Best of the worst. HSBC received the “most” favorable responses, but only 5 groups 
reported that HSBC consistently modifies loans with fixed rates for the life of the loan. 
At the same time, 19 groups responded that HSBC does not do this. 
• Worst of the worst. Merrill Lynch received only one response stating that it modifies 
loans for the long term and 13 responses that it does not.  
 
Postponing the day of reckoning. In general, for borrowers in early delinquency or facing 
unaffordable rate resets, servicers are not fixing rates for the long term. Groups were asked if 
individual servicers, and servicers as a whole, were fixing interest rates for 1 year, 2 years, 5 
years, or more. 
• Short term “fixes.” Counseling groups were most likely to respond that lenders were only 
                                                 
1 Joe Adler, “Bair: Increase Modifications,” American Banker, September 28, 2007.  
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willing to fix interest rates for one year at a time when modifying loans. This was true for 
individual lenders and for all lenders as a whole.  These short term modifications most 
likely only delay the problem for another year, and are akin to giving the borrower 
another bad loan with a short period of affordability followed by increasing payments 
that may be hard to make. 
• Best of the worst. Individual servicers were reported to be willing to fix interest rates for 
1, 2, 5, or more years.  
o 4 groups responded that Wells Fargo was willing to fix interest rates for 2 years 
when modifying loans.  
o 2 groups responded that Citibank and HSBC were willing to fix interest rates for 5 
years when modifying loans. 
o 2 groups responded that Countrywide was willing to fix interest rates for more 
than 5 years when modifying loans. 
• Worst of the worst. Merrill Lynch was the only servicer to receive 0 responses that it is 
willing to modify loans for 5 years, or more than five years.
 
Devastating borrower outcomes. Counseling agencies were asked how common the following 
different loss mitigation outcomes were for their borrowers: loan modification, forbearance 
agreement, refinance loan, short sale, foreclosure, or “other.” 
• Foreclosures lead. Groups were most likely to report foreclosure a “very common” 
outcome for borrowers. 19 groups reported foreclosure as a very common outcome. 
• Short sales next.  11 groups cited short sales - where servicers agree to allow the 
homeowners to sell the property for less than the amount of money owed – as a “very 
common” outcome for borrowers. While preferable to foreclosure, short sales leave the 
borrower without a home, and may result in a higher tax bill. 
• Loan modifications and refinances not happening. A large 21 groups reported that 
refinancings were “not common” and 15 groups reported that loan modifications are “not 
common.” Only 1 counseling agency responded that loan modifications are a “very 
common” outcome for borrowers; only 1 group responded that refinancings were a “very 
common” outcome for borrowers. For borrowers facing foreclosure, refinancing and loan 
modification are relatively good outcomes. That these positive outcomes are not 
occurring on the ground on any scale is distressing.  
• Forbearance agreements presented a mixed picture. They were listed as “very common” 
by 8 groups, “somewhat common” by 12 groups, and “not common” by 8 groups. 
 
No outreach to borrowers in trouble. Despite lenders assertions about reaching out to 
borrowers BEFORE they face problems from rising interest rates and higher monthly payments, 
most counseling agencies do not see this happening.   
• No early contact. For the industry as a whole, a surprising 24 respondents said that in 
their experience, lenders were NOT making contact with borrowers before delinquency. 
Only one group reported that early contact was being made with borrowers at risk of 
foreclosure. 
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• Best of the worst. Citibank received 5 votes for its willingness to work with borrowers 
before reset. At the same time, 9 respondents said Citibank is not willing to work with 
borrowers before delinquency.  
• Worst of the worst. HSBC, Merrill Lynch and Wells Fargo each received 2 responses 
stating that they reach out to borrowers before delinquency. Yet 15 respondents said that 
HSBC does NOT show a willingness to work with borrowers before delinquency, as did 
13 respondents for Merrill and 15 respondents for Wells. 
 
Servicers hard to work with. Counseling agencies were asked, “in your experience, which 
lenders/servicers are the most difficult to work with in trying to keep borrowers in their homes? 
Why?” 
• A total of 13 companies were named as servicers that are difficult to work with. 
• Countrywide, Merrill Lynch (which owns Wilshire, HLS and First Franklin) Washington 
Mutual and Wells Fargo were named most often, 5 times each, for being difficult. 
• Other companies named include: Chase, Ocwen, Nova, Option One, Gateway, GMAC, 
Litton, Specialized Loan Servicing, and HSBC. 
 
Out of the Mouths of Counseling Agencies. When asked to comment on companies that are 
especially difficult to work with, counseling agencies had a lot to say. Comments expressed 
frustration with companies that do not offer any real solutions and that provide poor customer 
service. Below is a sampling of comments made by counseling agencies. For additional 
comments, please see Appendix I.  
 
“All lenders said they don’t want to foreclose on home[s]. But when it comes to giving their 
customers an option, they always want the full amount of the delinquency and refuse to 
change the terms to help the borrower.” 
 
“They make it very difficult for the borrowers to communicate. They send letters to the 
borrowers offering payment options and once the borrower calls, they say those letters are 
generated by their computer system. Once the borrowers come to get our help, we as 
counselors have a hard time getting to [the] right person. Even with direct numbers, we still 
have a hard time reaching those individuals.” 
 
“We find that due to high volumes of calls from consumers concerning mortgage 
delinquency issues and a shortage in lender/servicer personnel, many consumers may not 
receive the attention they require to avoid foreclosure.  Additionally, we find that some 
lenders are not inclined to accept partial payments during the borrower’s period of hardship.  
There are instances where the lender will not supply a permanent loan modification during 
pre-foreclosure.  We would suggest that lenders be more proactive with borrowers by seeking 
to contact them prior to serious delinquency, and by being more flexible in their programs to 
resolve delinquency issues and avoid foreclosure.  Lenders providing specialized 
departments dedicated to working with housing counseling agencies seeking to assist 
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distressed homeowners with foreclosure prevention initiatives have been beneficial to the 
homeowner.” 
 
Counseling Agencies Large and Small. The groups that took the time to fill out this survey 
represent a cross section of counseling agencies in the state. 
• Groups came from various parts of California, including northern California, the San 
Francisco Bay Area, the Central Valley, greater Los Angeles, and the San Diego region. 
Groups work in rural and urban areas. 
• There was a fairly even distribution of the number of clients served by respondents. 
Groups that responded to the question were evenly distributed in the following buckets: 
groups that saw up to 10 clients in the month of August; groups that saw up to 20 clients; 
groups that saw up to 50 clients; and groups that saw close to 100 clients. One group 
reported seeing a few hundred clients in the month of August. Finally, one group served a 
few thousand clients in the month of August. A few agencies did not answer this 
question. 
• Most groups reported a near doubling in the number of clients served over the last 6 
months. The groups that responded to this CRC survey served approximately 9,800 
consumers, including nearly 3,800 consumers through in-person meetings, in the month 
of August alone. This was an increase of 3,700 consumers, including an additional 1,600 
face to face meetings, from February of this year.  
 
INCREASING DISCUSSIONS BUT NO CLEAR RESULTS 
 
Lenders declare desire to do workouts. In public statements, at Congressional and regulatory 
hearings, and in meetings with the California Reinvestment Coalition and other community 
groups, lenders repeat the now common refrain that is in everyone’s interest – borrower, lender, 
servicer, investor – to keep the borrower in her home and avoid foreclosure.  
 
“Nobody wins when a borrower loses his or her home to foreclosure – not the banker, not the 
borrower and not America’s communities,” according to Mortgage Bankers Association Chair 
John Robbins, CMB.2 
 
“It is always in the best interest of the servicer, the borrower, and the investors if we can modify 
a loan, because foreclosure means there’s no chance the investor is going to recoup their 
money,” said Tom Kelly, a spokesman for JPMorgan Chase & Co.3  Yet as foreclosures mount, 
there is no clear evidence that loan modifications and workouts are occurring at any scale.   
 
Steps in the right direction. The public discourse has broadened to include discussion about the 
importance of loss mitigation and loan modifications, and government at various levels is 
looking to encourage loan workouts. This is all for the good. 
                                                 
2 Mike Sorohan and John Mechem, “Democrats Call for Foreclosure Prevention Action,” MBA, October 4, 2007. 
3 Kate Berry, “A Speed Bump for Mortgage Workout Efforts,” American Banker, September 26, 2007. 
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In May of this year, Senator Christopher Dodd announced a Statement of Principles which called 
on lenders to contact borrowers early in the process, modify loans to create long term 
affordability, dedicate resources to aid large scale modifications, encourage low cost 
refinancings for those who qualify, and work with the GSEs to ensure credit is available.4   
 
Additionally, federal banking regulators have encouraged financial institutions to do loan 
workouts by offering Community Reinvestment Act credit and by clarifying that institutions will 
not face regulatory penalties if they pursue reasonable workout arrangements with borrowers.5  
 
Another positive development is the announcement by Attorneys General and banking regulators 
from 10 states, including California, that they have formed a task force hoping to persuade 
mortgage servicing companies and investors in mortgage backed securities to increase the 
number of troubled subprime loans they restructure to stem the tide of foreclosures.6  
 
Additionally, the California Department of Financial Institutions is currently surveying state 
lender licensees about the dollar volume and number of loans that have been subject to 
foreclosure, short sale, or have been subject to rewrite or workout, over an 8-month period. The 
California Department of Corporations may similarly survey licensees on loss mitigation 
outcomes, though it has not yet done so.7 
 
No accountability. Sadly, the growing attention paid to these issues has yet to translate into 
greater action for distressed homeowners. Currently, servicers are under no obligation to provide 
meaningful, consistent and verifiable data to regulators and the public about their success in 
helping borrowers stay in their homes.  Accordingly, few servicers provide any information at 
all, and for those that do, it is not clear what the public is to make of the information provided. 
 
Countrywide as example. A case in point is Countrywide, which recently announced it was 
working to modify loans. Countrywide said that it expects to modify terms on nearly 25,000 
home loans this year to help people avoid foreclosure. The company said it has already modified 
more than 17,000 home loans this year, and provided assistance on about 35,000 mortgages, 
including through repayment plans, postponement of payments and refinancings.8 “Our number 
one priority is to help borrowers stay in their homes,” said Steve Bailey, Senior Managing 
                                                 
4 “Homeownership Preservation Summit Principles Update, Office of U.S. Senator Chris Dodd,” May 2, 2007, www.dodd.senate.gov. 
5 “Federal Regulators Encourage Institutions to Work with Mortgage Borrowers Who Are Unable to Make Their Payments,” Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, April 17, 2007.  
6 The group, which includes the Attorney General of the state of California, wants servicers to create longer term solutions for distressed 
borrowers, such as lowering the borrowers’ mortgage interest rate, rather than creating a repayment plan that offers a temporary fix. A policy 
paper prepared as part of the effort by Iowa Attorney General Patrick Madigan suggests, among other things, that servicers boost their loan-
modification staffs, create teams dedicated to handling loan modifications, increase training and provide front line employees with financial 
incentives that would encourage them to save homes rather than moving borrowers towards foreclosure. Ruth Simon, “Task Force Will Seek 
More Loan Revisions,” The Wall Street Journal, September 8-9, 2007. 
7 Final Report, “Preserving the American Dream: Homeownership Preservation and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,” Senate Committee on 
Banking, Finance and Insurance, September 2007. 
8 Jonathan Stempel, “UPDATE 1-Countrywide sees modifying 25,000 mortgages in ‘07”, Reuters, September 24, 2007. 
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Director of Loan Administration. “Countrywide has the right tools, processes and staff to help 
homeowners avoid foreclosure.”9 
 
But what do these numbers mean?  On one investor conference call, Countrywide officials 
responded to a related question by saying, “most of the modifications do … represent the 
deferment of past due interest or capitalization of the past due amount. And, to a far lesser extent 
– in fact, it is not very material at all the percent that represent – interest rate reductions.”10 This 
suggests that Countrywide may be focusing more on pushing back delinquent payments than in 
restructuring loans to provide long term affordability. 
 
A recent New York Times article provided another perspective on Countrywide’s statement. It 
noted that Countrywide claimed it provided assistance on a mere 8.8% of the loans in its 
servicing portfolio that were in delinquency. The article also suggested that up to 14% of the 
assistance Countrywide was counting included short sales and deeds in lieu of foreclosure,11 both 
of which result in the borrower losing her home. Countrywide responded saying it provided 
workout programs to keep more than 35,000 mortgagors in their homes, and assisted with short 
sales and deeds in lieu for nearly 5,000 borrowers who did not have the financial means to stay 
in their homes. Countrywide asserted that it anticipated completing 25,000 loan modifications 
this year.12 The difficulty in reconciling these numbers and understanding their significance 
argues for more consistent, verifiable and detailed reporting obligations on all servicers.   
 
Investor interests as barrier.  It is not clear that the industry is united in its desire to see loan 
modifications and workouts for borrowers in trouble. Most investors in attendance at a recent 
Subprime Asset Backed Securities Conference reportedly indicated that they are not pleased with 
subprime servicers’ growing reliance on loan modifications to avoid foreclosure. Jason Stewart, 
a portfolio manager at Barrier Investments, a company that advises and manages hedge funds, 
said loan modifications hurt profits for those who purchase investment grade tranches of 
subprime MBS. “Loan modifications only benefit a few people: the people at the bottom of the 
capital structure,” he said. According to Inside B&C Lending, investors are concerned because 
loan modifications affect subprime MBS payment triggers. And at least one subprime servicer is 
moving away from such loss mitigation techniques.13   
 
Yet, “the loan modifications that investors are so concerned about seem to be fairly far down the 
preference list of loss mitigation options. ‘So far the use of loan modifications is very limited 
compared to other loss mitigation options,’ according to Diane Pendley, a managing director at 
Fitch Ratings.”14 
 
                                                 
9 “Borrowers Facing Challenges Urged to Contact Countrywide’s Home Retention Team,” CNN Money, September 24, 2007. 
10 Comments of Kevin Bartlett from Countrywide Financial Investor teleconference for Q2 2007, July 24, 2007  
11 Gretchen Morgensen, “Can These Mortgages Be Saved,” New York Times, September 30, 2007. 
12 “Countrywide Response to the New York Times,” September 28, 2007. 
13 “Investors Ready to Buy Subprime Mortgages, but Predict Delays,” Inside B&C Lending, September 21, 2007. 
14 “Servicers, Investors at Odds As Defaults and Costs Rise,” Inside B&C Lending, October 5, 2007. 
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Industry practices as barrier. Further, the industry still needs to change practices that create 
disincentives to loan modification. “Certain processes in the industry are driving the wrong 
behavior,” said Wes Mee, an executive vice president and the chief operating officer of First 
American Corp’s national default title service. For example, he said foreclosure attorneys are not 
paid for doing workouts and actually get higher ratings and earn foreclosure fees if a borrower 
goes into foreclosure.15 The industry should identify and eradicate such barriers to loan 
modification. 
 
Servicers overwhelmed, borrowers suffer. Clearly, servicers are having difficulty keeping up 
with the growing wave of delinquent borrowers. “Despite much talk of proactive efforts by the 
mortgage industry to work with troubled homeowners, evidence is beginning to accumulate that 
many servicers are struggling just to process, let alone resolve, the surging defaults... At least 2 
of the top 5 servicers have been telling borrowers it will take two to three months to determine 
whether a loan qualifies for a workout, according to Ron Morgan, the president of strategic 
default solutions at MortgageHub Inc. ‘Such delays push more borrowers into foreclosure.’ he 
said.”16 Servicers must commit additional resources to meeting the increased demand for loss 
mitigation services so that borrowers do not suffer further. 
 
Moody’s says loan modifications are not happening. On September 21, 2007 Moody’s 
released the results of a survey it conducted of the modification practices of subprime mortgage 
servicers regarding borrowers that have or will experience an interest rate reset on their loans in 
either 2007 or 2008. Sixteen servicers with a total servicing volume of approximately $950 
billion, or roughly 80% of the market, provided data. “Despite much industry dialogue and heavy 
press attention on the topic of loan modifications as a mitigation technique to avoid foreclosure 
and reduce losses on defaulted loans, the survey results suggest that on average subprime 
servicers have only recently begun to materially increase the number of modifications as it 
relates to interest rate resets. Specifically, the survey showed that most servicers had only 
modified approximately 1% of their serviced loans that experienced a reset in the months of 
January, April and July 2007… Based on the survey results, Moody’s is concerned that the 
number of modifications that will be performed in the future by subprime servicers on loans 
facing resets may be lower than what will be needed to significantly mitigate losses in subprime 
pools backing rated securitizations.”17  
 
Many industry, regulatory and consumer groups seem to agree that borrowers are not benefiting 
from loan modifications and other positive alternatives as they should. 
 
                                                 
15 Kate Berry, “A Speed Bump for Mortgage Workout Efforts,” American Banker, September 26, 2007. 
16 Kate Berry, “A Speed Bump for Mortgage Workout Efforts,” American Banker, September 26, 2007. 




In order to keep borrowers in their homes, and to address the concerns of housing counseling 
agencies, CRC urges lenders and policy makers to each take 4 key steps. Many of these concepts 
are found in the California Reinvestment Coalition’s Homeownership Preservation Best 
Practices. For the full list of Best Practices, see Appendix II. 
 
Lenders Must:  
 
1. Modify loans to keep all borrowers in their homes. Lenders must focus resources on loan 
modifications that provide borrowers with loans that are affordable for the long term. Lenders 
should lower interest rates, convert adjustable rate loans to fixed rate loans for the long term, and 
reduce the amount of money owed in order to stabilize families. For adjustable rate loans that 
will become unaffordable when rates reset, lenders must convert the loans into fixed rate loans 
where the interest rate is fixed for the remainder of the life of the loan.  
 
2. Be more transparent and accountable.  Servicers must report semiannually on their loss 
mitigation outcomes, including how many loans went to loan modification, refinance, payment 
plans, forbearance agreements, short sales, deeds in lieu, and foreclosures. Servicers should 
report on whether loans are modified for a period of years, or for the life of the loan. 
 
3. Return foreclosed properties to the community.  Lenders should develop a process to sell 
foreclosed properties to nonprofit groups so that properties won’t fall into the hands of 
unscrupulous speculators and disinterested investors. Local nonprofits that acquire these 
properties can help first time homebuyers build assets or create affordable rental housing 
opportunities that preserve the property as a community asset. 
• Servicers should give nonprofits a right of first refusal to acquire foreclosed properties. 
• Banks should develop and offer a low cost financing product for nonprofits who wish to 
buy these properties. 
 
4. Support home loan counseling agencies and legal service providers.  These groups are on 
the front lines of efforts to prevent foreclosure. Lenders, policy makers and community groups 
are referring more and more consumers to these agencies, but their capacity is being stretched to 
meet the increased demand. Lenders should dramatically increase funding for counseling 
agencies and legal service providers as they deal with a problem not of their making.  
 
Policy Makers Must: 
 
1. Pass laws that promote loan modifications and tax relief for short sales. Congress is 
currently considering a number of bills to help distressed homeowners. 
• Congress needs to amend the Bankruptcy Code to permit bankruptcy judges to modify 
the terms of homeowners’ primary mortgages, including by lowering interest rates and 
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cramming down the amount of money owed.   
• Congress should also provide tax relief for the increasing number of borrowers facing a 
short sale, where borrowers agree to sell the home for less than the amount of money 
owed, and have the lender forgive the remainder of the debt. 
 
2. Develop a state rescue refinance loan product. Efforts to expand FHA loan products are 
positive but will not go far enough to help most homeowners in distress in California. The state 
must step into this void to help low and moderate income borrowers who have been victimized 
by predatory lending practices and are at risk of losing their homes. Other states are already 
doing this. With California in the midst of a foreclosure crisis, the legislature and Governor did 
little to help borrowers at risk of losing their homes. The California state legislature considered a 
bill earlier this year that would have authorized the state housing finance agency to develop a 
rescue refinance product, but the bill died in committee.  
 
3. Pass strong anti predatory lending legislation to ensure problems don’t recur. Many of 
the problems we face today could have been dealt with in years past with stronger consumer 
protection legislation. Congress and the state legislature must commit to preventing this crisis 
from recurring by passing strong anti predatory lending legislation that requires that loans be 
suitable for borrowers, and that bans prepayment penalties and yield spread premiums (fees the 
broker receives from the lender for selling a higher interest rate to a borrower). Legislation must 
also hold investors and Wall Street firms liable for violations so that they will exercise increased 
due diligence and refrain from financing predatory loans. 
 
4. Provide real oversight. Federal and state regulators have not fulfilled their obligation to 
examine lenders and brokers for compliance with existing law. We are now witnessing the 
devastating consequences of this failure. Legislators must fulfill their oversight duty and ensure 




APPENDIX I: COMMENTS OF COUNSELING AGENCIES 
 
Counseling agencies were asked, “In your experience, which lenders/servicers are the most difficult to 
work with in trying to keep borrowers in their homes? Why?”  Their responses follow: 
 
“Usually when I called the lender during the counseling so that my client can talk to them 
and request a working plan, there is no help from the lender or servicer. Usually [it’s] 
because there is not enough money to cover the new reset payment. For the most part, my 
clients would like for the lender to keep the original interest to be able to keep making the 
house payments.” 
 
“In our experience ASC, Nova Mortgage and most servicers have been difficult to work with. 
The servicers have a standard check list for their so called foreclosure solutions that do not 
assist the delinquent homeowners in a significant form.” 
 
“Countrywide especially will not discuss options with counselors or clients until [the] 
mortgage is three months delinquent.”  
 
“All lenders said they don’t want to foreclose on home[s]. But when it comes to giving their 
customers an option, they always want the full amount of the delinquency and refuse to 
change the terms to help the borrower.” 
 
“Countrywide, GMAC, Wells Fargo, WAMU, Ocwen Loan Servicing, Litton Loan 
Servicing, Specialized Loan Servicing. They don’t care about the customer, they just care 
that they obtain their payment.” 
 
“CHASE, all lenders based in Texas, secondary lenders, and all predatory lenders. Why? 
Borrowers are not able to work on any loan modification whatsoever. They make it very 
difficult for the borrowers to communicate. They send letters to the borrowers offering 
payment options and once the borrower calls, they say those letters are generated by their 
computer system. Once the borrowers come to get our help, we as counselors have a hard 
time getting to [the] right person. Even with direct numbers, we still have a hard time 
reaching those individuals.” 
 
“Countrywide Advocacy Team which has been set up is non responsive to counselors and 
will often refer to regular work out department who do not show the flexibility that was 
promised.” 
 
“Ocwen  - customer service/collection overseas.” 
 
“WAMU- Collection Department does not communicate with LMIT Department.” 
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“Wells Fargo – Always loses documents. Taking over 2 weeks to document information on 
accounts.” 
 
“Wilshire and Option One (won’t call borrower or counselor back).” 
 
“Wells Fargo Bank, Washington Mutual and Wilshire. They give you the run around on what 
they need to qualify for the workout.” 
 
“We have had a lot of difficulty even getting a person on the phone to talk with Washington 
Mutual, First Franklin, Countrywide and Gateway Bank. The turnaround time for getting a 
negotiator assigned to a client for WaMu to even begin loss mitigation procedures has been 
very long, over one month. In fact, we’re still waiting for two of our clients.” 
 
“We find that due to high volumes [of] calls from consumers concerning mortgage 
delinquency issues and a shortage in lender/servicer personnel, many consumers may not 
receive the attention they require to avoid foreclosure.  Additionally, we find that some 
lenders are not inclined to accept partial payments during the borrower’s period of hardship.  
There are instances where the lender will not supply a permanent loan modification during 
pre-foreclosure.  We would suggest that lenders be more proactive with borrowers by seeking 
to contact them prior to serious delinquency, and by being more flexible in their programs to 
resolve delinquency issues and avoid foreclosure.  Lenders providing specialized 
departments dedicated to working with housing counseling agencies seeking to assist 
distressed homeowners with foreclosure prevention initiatives have been beneficial to the 
homeowner.” 
 
“Wells Fargo mortgage loans [are] questionable to begin with. Unable to reach loss 
mitigation until too late. Cut off several times, faxes never arrived. Lenders/servicers in 
connection with mortgage brokers – difficult to determine who lender/servicer is and then 
showing no interest in a work out of any kind. Uncooperative attitude with borrower.” 
 
“HSBC – no loss mitigation department.” 
 
“All lenders. No programs until homeowner 3 months past due. Past due amount is high and 
lenders usually want half down.” 
 
“They are all pretty much the same overall. The biggest problem is that there is a high 
volume of cases to be worked in [a] small window of time. Adding to this problem is the fact 
that those assigned to work these cases do so with attitude of a collections agent rather than a 
counselor. It is for this reason that trained field outreach workers could and would provide a 
softer face to the consumers as representatives of the lender.” 
 
“Countrywide: in a couple of cases, they have been unwilling to negotiate anything.” 
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“No one is able to achieve any workouts with any lenders and we have more foreclosures 
now than we have had in the last 10 years, by probably close to 100%. We also have huge 
problems with foreclosure rescue scams and no lender oversight and with tenants of 
foreclosed homeowners for whom lenders will do nothing but give brief notice and 
threatened eviction. We also have an impossible time trying to figure out who is the lender 
with which we need to negotiate.” 
 
“Litton, WaMu, Wilshire Credit. Deaf to recommendation outside their script; dumb due to 
need for other approval levels; blind to consistently documenting the file since you seldom 
speak to the same person twice.” 
 
“The most difficult to work with are the local brokers whose servicing provider makes it 
more challenging to modify the loan versus the larger institutions.” 
 
“Countrywide, we have experienced a lack of priority to work with clients that are in need to  
modify or restructure loans.” 
 
“On two reverse mortgage cases, Liberty was the lender and was very uncooperative. They 
don’t take phone calls and don’t respond timely to letters, either.” 
 
“Seattle Mortgage was very cooperative and allowed our client more time to comply with the 
terms of her Rapid Rider so that she didn’t go into foreclosure.” 
 
“The most common problems folks (consumers) report at the workshops are: difficulty in 
reaching someone on the phone they can talk to about workouts; no response to workout 
packages sent in; many consumers have 2 loans, which makes certain workouts nearly 
impossible; many consumers are dealing with servicers other than the original lender; many 
of loans are ARMs; most of the consumers don’t have equity in their house; as a (sort of) 
positive trend, we are seeing more people earlier on in the process – e.g. before the adjustable 
rate resets, or before they are actually in default.  In the past, folks would tend to come in 
near the end of the process, i.e., just before the trustee sale. This may be because of a 
combination of 1) more general awareness of the problem; and 2) our outreach with the 
workshop format; the foreclosure rescue scams I have seen were done, say, a year ago. Most 
of the people that we see now bought or refinanced a year or 2 ago, and have no equity left. 
Many of the people we see complain they only now have learned the terms of their loans 
(e.g. thought they’d gotten a fixed rate, but ended up with an ARM.” 
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APPENDIX II: CRC’S HOME OWNERSHIP PRESERVATION BEST PRACTICES 
 
Outreach and education of at risk homeowners  
Lenders should form partnerships with and support nonprofit counseling agencies and related 
community groups in order to reach and counsel the hundreds of thousands of California 
borrowers at-risk of foreclosure, including the 50% of borrowers who go into foreclosure without 
contacting their lender.  
• Servicers should provide early notice to borrowers who are facing loans with resetting 
interest rates. Lenders should contact borrowers 6 months prior to the rate reset, 
informing borrowers about how much their new payments will be, and urging them to 
contact the servicer if they will have trouble with the new payments. Outreach to 
borrowers is best done in partnership with a locally known and trusted community group, 
through co-branded letters, community meetings, referrals and related approaches. 
• Lenders and servicers should fund community groups to contact, counsel and make loss 
mitigation recommendations for their borrowers. 
• All public education materials and communication should be in the various languages 
spoken by borrowers in California. 
• Lenders and servicers should fund and build the capacity of community based 
organizations over the next few years so that these groups can respond to the crisis we are 
now facing. 
 
Strong loss mitigation policies to keep borrowers in their homes 
Lenders should focus resources on loan modifications that provide borrowers with loans that are 
affordable for the long term. Lenders should lower interest rates, convert adjustable rate loans to 
fixed rate loans for the long term, and reduce the amount of money owed in order to stabilize 
families. 
• For adjustable rate loans that will become unaffordable when rates reset, lenders 
should convert the loans into fixed rate loans where the interest rate is fixed for the 
remainder of the life of the loan. At a minimum, servicers should fix the interest rate 
for 5 years. 
• Lenders should negotiate more aggressive loss mitigation provisions in their servicing 
agreements with investors. A big impediment to loan modifications comes from 
overly restrictive investor guidelines. 
 
Transparency of loss mitigation efforts  
Lenders should publicize their loss mitigation programs and the parameters they use in deciding 
how they can help distressed borrowers. This will encourage overwhelmed borrowers to come 
forward. Lenders should also report on their loss mitigation outcomes so that there is 
accountability built into the process of how lenders are dealing with their borrowers at risk of 
foreclosure. 
• Servicers should develop public education materials describing their loss mitigation tools, 
such as loan modifications, repayment plans and short sales. 
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• Servicers should report semiannually on their loss mitigation outcomes, including how 
many loans went to loan modification, refinance, payment plans, forbearance agreements, 
short sales, deeds in lieu, and foreclosures.  
 
Refinance Products  
Lenders should offer special rescue refinance products for borrowers who are having difficulty 
making payments and who cannot qualify for a loan modification. Counseling agencies report 
they often have difficulty getting loan modifications for borrowers, including from the smaller 
servicing companies and where the original lender has gone out of business. Many borrowers 
who would have been able to refinance their loans in the past are unable to do so as home prices 
in the state have fallen.  
• Lenders should offer refinance loans designed to help borrowers who are unable to meet 
their mortgage payments, but who have income to support a new loan. These loans 
should focus on borrowers’ ability to repay the loan, and should discount whether 
borrowers currently owe more than their properties are worth or are behind on their 
current mortgage.  
• Whenever a borrower contacts the servicer or lender, the servicer or lender should take 
that opportunity to see if the borrower qualifies for a lower cost loan, and, if so, offer the 
borrower that lower cost loan. 
• Servicers should waive prepayment penalties in order to help struggling borrowers who 
are able to refinance to get out of unaffordable loans. 
 
Provide grant funds to borrowers in distress 
Lenders should provide funds to borrowers who are falling behind on mortgage and other 
payments. Relatively small amounts of money can make the difference for borrowers who are 
close to catching up on their mortgage payments, or who are eligible for good loan modifications 
but need some cash to pay delinquent taxes. 
 
REO property disposition  
Lenders should develop a process to sell foreclosed and related properties to nonprofit groups so 
that properties won’t fall into the hands of unscrupulous speculators and disinterested investors. 
Local nonprofits that acquire these properties can help first time homebuyers to build assets, and 
can preserve the property as a community asset. 
• Servicers should give nonprofits a right of first refusal to acquire REO properties. 
• Banks should develop and offer a low cost financing product for nonprofits who wish to 
buy these properties. 
 
 
Channel of communication  
Lenders should establish a dedicated phone line and staff to work with counselors hitting barriers 
with frontline loss mitigation staff, and for advocates who are working with borrowers 
victimized by unsuitable loans they want to fix; better train servicers to act in line with company 
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policies regarding loan modifications; and create incentives at all levels for servicers to modify 
loans for long term affordability. 
 
Good origination practices to prevent future problems 
Lenders should improve lending practices and underwriting guidelines to ensure predatory loans 
are not sold and to ensure that we don’t repeat the mistakes of the past to create a future crisis.  
• Lenders should follow new federal guidance on nontraditional and subprime loans 
designed to ensure all borrowers can afford their mortgages, even after any future 
resetting of interest rates. The federal guidance should be extended to cover all state 
lenders and brokers. 
• Lenders should stop originating stated income or no documentation loans, which have 
been responsible for much abuse in California. 
• Lenders should develop effective oversight of mortgage brokers, some of whom have 
been responsible for predatory lending in California communities. Lenders should be stop 
paying brokers Yield Spread Premiums that reward brokers for putting borrowers into 
loans with higher interest rates and with prepayment penalties. 
• Lenders should ensure that all borrowers have access to the lowest priced loans that are 
offered by that lender and that lender’s affiliates. Prime borrowers who enter through the 
subprime lender should have access to prime products. This is a serious fair lending issue. 
• Lenders and brokers should translate key loan documents and loan terms into non English 
languages if the loan was negotiated in another language. 
 
 
 
